Effectiveness of The Board of Directors and Company Performance: Corporate Governance Perspective in Indonesia by Pratiwi, Ririh Dian & Chariri, Anis
 
 	JPEB Vol. 6, No. 1, 2021, pp: 17 - 27 
 
Jurnal Penelitian Ekonomi dan Bisnis 
 




Effectiveness of The Board of Directors and Company Performance: Corporate 
Governance Perspective in Indonesia 
 
Ririh Dian Pratiwi1*, Anis Chariri2  
 
1 Doctoral (PDIE) Student, Diponegoro University, Indonesia 





Accepted: September 2020 
Approved: January 2021  
Published: March 2021 
________________ 
Keywords: 













The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of board size, board independence, 
and board activity on company performance from a corporate governance perspective. 
This study uses a quantitative approach. IDX issuers in the manufacturing sector 
registered in 2017-2018 are the research population. The samples were obtained using 
the purposive sampling method. Based on the criteria, the samples in this study were 146 
companies. This study uses multiple linear regression analysis. This study found that 
board size has a negative effect on ROA, but has an effect on and is positively correlated 
with ROE. Board independence has a positive effect on the achievement of company 
ROA and ROE. While the third variable, namely board activity does not affect the 
achievement of ROA and ROE of the company. Based on the limitations, further 
research is expected to be able to explore other factors that are relevant in influencing 
company performance during and after the COVID 19 pandemic, for example, namely 
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Corporate governance is important in business (Shahid et al., 2020). According to Zabri et al. (2016), the 
issue of corporate governance in Asia became a concern after the Asian crisis in 1997. This problem is also 
increasingly interesting for academic research, after the Enron case in 2008. Shahwan (2015) and Jo & Harjoto 
(2011) argue that corporate governance can affect company performance. The quality of corporate governance is 
based on the principles of transparency, stakeholder relations, the board of directors, and the company's ownership 
structure. According to Larcker (2007) in Arayssi & Jizi (2019) good corporate governance shows an indication of 
their transparency and responsibility. This means that a company that has good management will produce a good 
performance. 
  The implementation of corporate governance can be seen from the perspective of agency relations. In an 
agency relationship, there is a separation of interests between owners and managers (Jensen dan Meckling, 1976). 
Agency conflicts will occur because company owners and managers have different interests. Agency theory explains 
that companies with strong governance will do better than companies with weak governance (Bhatt & Bhatt, 
2017). Zabri et al. (2016) stated that there are two governance mechanisms, namely internal and external 
mechanisms. Internal mechanisms include the size of the board and the independent board of commissioners. 
External mechanisms include market competition and the labor market. According to Tristiarini et al., (2017); 
Setiawanta & Purwanto (2019); Krishnan et al., (2017); Utama et al., (2017); Nurazi et al., (2020); Jaffar & Abdul-
Shukor (2016); Kao et al., (2019) corporate governance mechanisms can improve company performance. 
The involvement of the board of directors consistently will affect company performance (Bhagat & Bolton, 
2019; Goyal et al., 2019). This study uses internal mechanism indicators, namely the effectiveness of the board of 
directors, which includes board size, board independence, and board activity. Research on corporate governance 
has been carried out in several countries with different findings. Research by Zabri et al. (2016) found a negative 
influence between board size on company performance as measured by ROA. Arayssi & Jizi (2019), in their 
research using board characteristics and ownership structure in controlling and analyzing company performance. 
The result found is that concentrated family ownership can replace board independence by forming a governance 
committee. In contrast to research conducted by Narwal & Pathneja (2016), who found no effect between board 
size and the number of board meetings on banking performance. Similar results were also found by Shahwan 
(2015), in his research, there is no influence between corporate governance and company performance in Egypt. 
Indonesia is one of the countries that supports the implementation of good corporate governance (OECD, 
2019 and Siagian et al., 2013). This study will examine board effectiveness and company performance from the 
perspective of corporate governance practices in Indonesia. Specifically, this research aims to answer the 
relationship and influence of corporate governance as measured by the number of boards, board independence, 
and board activity on company performance in Indonesia.    
       
Hypotheses Development   
Related to agency theory, a larger board size will have a good effect on firm performance. This is because 
the larger the board size will have the ability to pressure management to minimize debt costs and improve company 
performance (Ofoeda, 2017).  Zabri et al., (2016) and Orozco et al., (2018) stated that the size of the board of 
directors is very important in managing a company. The standard size of the board of directors from one country 
to another will be different. This is due to the different cultures in each of these countries. According to previous 
researchers, board size will affect the quality of corporate governance, so that it will have an impact on company 
performance. Leblanc & Gillies (2003) argue that about eight to eleven people on the board of directors are the 
optimal size. Ofoeda (2017) and Johl et al., (2015), in their research, found evidence that board size has a positive 
relationship with company performance. More and more boards of directors will have a variety of expertise that 
will support corporate governance, to improve company performance. This description can support the hypothesis 
of this study. 
H1a: Board size has a positive effect on ROA. 
H1b: Board size has a positive effect on  ROE. 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) explained that in agency theory, the interests of managers will be achieved by 
ignoring the interests of owners. Agency problems can be reduced by the independence of the board of directors. 
Corporate governance mechanisms related to board independence are measured by the composition of the 
independent board of directors. According to Prabowo & Simpson (2011), Board independence is a percentage of 
the ratio of the number of independent boards of directors to the entire board of directors. This means that the 
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more independent boards of directors, the more independence that can be achieved (Zabri et al., 2016). Based on 
this description, the following hypothesis can be formed: 
H2a: Board independence has a positive effect on ROA. 
H2b: Board independence has a positive effect on ROE. 
Good corporate governance mechanisms in the company are shown by the efficiency of the board of 
directors. According to Ofoeda (2017), the intensity of the meetings can show the effectiveness of their 
performance in monitoring managers, so it will have an impact on company performance. Board activity can be 
measured using the frequency of meetings held (Brick & Chidambaran, 2010). Research on the effect of board 
activity on company performance was conducted by Ntim & Osei (2011) in South Africa and Brick & 
Chidambaran (2010). Their research found that a board that meets frequently will result in high company 
performance. 
H3a: Board activity has a positive effect on ROA 
H3b: Board activity has a positive effect on ROE. 
              
METHOD 
 
The approach used in this study is a quantitative method, which shows a causal relationship. This study 
uses three independent variables and two dependent variables. The independent variable used is corporate 
governance as proxied by board size, board independence, and board activity. The dependent variable used is 
company performance as measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). The conceptual 











Figure I. Conceptual Framework 
 
The population used is issuers on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2017-2018, which includes companies 
in the manufacturing sector. Through the sample selection with the purposive sampling method, there were as 
many as 146 companies. This study obtained data sourced from the annual report, which is displayed on the website 
www.idx.co.id. Measurement of variables in this study is described in the following table:  
 
Table 1. Variable Measurement 
 
Variable type Variable Measurement Source 
Independent 
Variable 
- Board Size The number of board members in a 
company 
 Arayssi & Jizi 
(2019) 
- Board Independence The number of independent directors to 
total directors 
 Arayssi & Jizi 
(2019) 
- Board Activity Frequency of board meetings during the 





- Return on Asset Net income to total asset  Arayssi & Jizi 
(2019) 
- Return on Equity Net income to total shareholders’ equity  Zabri et al., 
(2016) 
  Source: Previous Research 
Board independence 
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The statistical method used is quantitative statistics. This study uses multiple linear regression to test the 
hypothesis. This research model is shown in the following equation: 
 
Equation I : Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + ε 
Information: 
Y = ROA 
α = constant 
β1 = regression coefficient X1 
β2 = regression coefficient X2 
β3 = regression coefficient X3 
X1 = Board Size 
X2 = Board independence 
X3 = Board Activity 
 
Equation II : Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + ε 
Information: 
Y = ROE 
α = constant 
β1 = regression coefficient X1 
β2 = regression coefficient X2 
β3 = regression coefficient X3 
X1 = Board Size 
X2 = Board independence 
X3 = Board Activity 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive test results are shown in the following table: 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
    N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Size 146 3 10 5.89 1.923 
Indepn 146 .20 .67 .4012 .13531 
Activ 146 2 9 4.36 1.904 
ROA 146 .14 .89 .3993 .19774 




                Source: data processing 
  
The table shows the mean board size score of 5.89 (approximately. 6 people), with a lower standard 
deviation of 1.923 (approximately 2 people). A lower standard deviation of the mean indicates that the board size 
data are closer to the mean. The average value of board independence is 0.4012 with a smaller standard deviation. 
Looking at this comparison, it can also be concluded that the condition of the board independence data is close to 
the average value. The mean values of the board activity variables, ROA and ROE are also each greater than the 
standard deviation. A standard deviation value that is smaller than the mean indicates that the data in the study are 
close to the average. 
  
Classic Assumptions 
The first classical assumption test is the normality test with the following test results: 
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Source:.data processing  
 







Source:.data processing  
 
The table above shows the results of the normality test in equations I and II. The significance value of the 
two Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, each is greater than the significant value of 0.05 (5%), so it can be concluded that 
the data in this study were normally distributed. The next classic assumption test is the heteroscedasticity test. The 
following is a table of heteroscedasticity test results: 
 







Source:.data processing  
 







Source:.data processing  
 
The results of the heteroscedasticity test of the two equations are shown in the table above. Based on the 
table, it can be seen that the significance value of all variables in equations I and II is above 0.05 (5%). Thus, it can 
be interpreted that the two regression models in the study did not have heteroscedasticity symptoms.  
 
Table 7. Multicollinearity of Equations I and II 
 
  
   
 
 
Source:.data processing  
 Unstandardized Residual 
N 146 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .059c 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
c. Lilliefors Significance Correction. 
 Unstandardized Residual 
N 146 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .070c 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
c. Lilliefors Significance Correction. 
Model Sig. 









Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Size .132 7.582 
Indepn .132 7.576 
Activ .998 1.002 
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The third classical assumption test performed in this study is the multicollinearity test. The test results in 
the below table concluded that there was no strong correlation between the independent variables used in this 
study. This conclusion is based on a tolerance value for each variable more than 0.1 and a VIF value less than 10. 
The last classic assumption test is the autocorrelation test. The Durbin-Watson test values in the two equations are 
respectively free of autocorrelation. The test results are shown in the following table: 
 




















1 .260a .067 .048 .80206 1.956 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Activ, Indepn, Size 
b. Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
Coefficient of Determination 
The ability of the independent variable in explaining the dependent variable can be tested by using the 
coefficient of determination test. The coefficient of determination is shown by the Adjusted R Square value as 
follows: 
Table 10. Coefficient of Determination of Equation I 
 








1 .623a .388 .375 .15634 1.911 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Activ, Indepn, Size 
b. Dependent Variable: ROA 
  





      




The testing equation I has an Adjusted R Square value of 0.375 (37.5%). This figure shows that the variation 
of the ROA variable is explained by 37.5% of the variables of board size, board independence, and board activity.  
Whereas equation II, it is obtained an Adjusted R Square of 0.048 (4.8%), which means that board independence 














1 .623a .388 .375 .15634 1.911 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Activ, Indepn, Size 
b. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Model R R Square Adjusted 
R Square 




1 .260a .067 .048 .80206 1.956 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Activ, Indepn, Size 
b. Dependent Variable: ROE 
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The simultaneous effect of all independent variables on the dependent variable was tested with the F 
statistical test. The following table is the test output of the two models: 
 
Table 12. Test Model Equation I 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.199 3 .733 29.985 .000b 
Residual 3.471 142 .024   
Total 5.670 145    
  a. Dependent Variable: ROA  
  b. Predictors: (Constant), Activ, Indepn, Size  
 
   Table 13. Test Model Equation II 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6.604 3 2.201 3.422 .019b 
Residual 91.349 142 .643   
Total 97.953 145    
a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Activ, Indepn, Size 
 
Both tables show that the significance values in the first and second models are 0.000 and 0.019. This value 
is smaller than the real level of 0.05 (5%). All independent variables in the equation I jointly affect the ROA variable. 
All the independent variables in the second equation also jointly affect the ROE variable. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 






B Std. Error Beta  
1 (Constant) .078 .052  1.495 .137 
Size -.049 .019 -.477 -2.640 .009 
Indepn 1.524 .264 1.043 5.769 .000 
Activ .000 .007 -.002 -.032 .974 
       a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
Testing on equation I can answer the hypothesis H1a, H2a, and H3a. The significance value of the variable 
board size is 0.009, significant at 5%. This means that board size has an effect on company performance. The board 
independence variable is also proven to have an effect on corporate performance. However, the variable board 
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Results for Hypothesis 1 
H1a in this study states that board size has a positive effect on ROA. This study found evidence that board 
size affects company performance as measured by ROA. Viewed from the point of view of agency theory, the greater 
the size of the board, the better it will be able to oversee the performance of managers so that they can make 
decisions that are in line with improving company performance. This study found a negative correlation between 
board size and ROA. This means that the smaller the board size, the more effective it is in overseeing the use of 
assets to generate profits. The smaller the board size will have the more appropriate contribution in increasing 
performance by optimizing the use of assets. The results of this study support the research conducted by Zabri et 
al., (2016), Nyamongo & Temesgen (2013), and Byard et al., (2006), who found that smaller board size is more 
effective in influencing ROA. Guest (2009) also found that board size has a negative effect on profitability in the 
UK. But, the results of this study are different from those found by Ofoeda (2017) and Narwal & Pathneja (2016). 
Ofoeda (2017) found that board size has a positive effect on ROA, and Narwal & Pathneja (2016) found that board 
size has no effect on company performance. 
H1b in this study states that board size has a positive effect on ROE. This study finds evidence that board 
size is positively correlated with corporate performance as measured by ROE. The higher the board size, the more 
optimal it is supervising managers in the efficient use of capital to generate profits. The data in this study show that 
the average number of boards in each company is six people. Most of the sample firms have board numbers close to 
average. This study found that an average board size of six people can influence the achievement of company 
performance as assessed by ROE. Board size can control managers in optimizing the use of capital to generate 
profits. The results of this study do not support Zabri et al., (2016) and Nyamongo & Temesgen, (2013), who 
found a negative correlation between board size and corporate performance as measured by ROE. The results of 
this study support Johl et al., (2015), who found that board size has an effect on company performance. Leblanc & 
Gillies (2003) state that the more the size of the board, the more optimal, about eight to eleven people on the board 
of directors are the optimal size. 
 
Results for Hypothesis 2 
The agency conflict proposed by Jensen & Meckling (1976) can be reduced by board independence. The 
higher the independence of the board, the higher the supervised performance of managers, so that the more trying 
to improve company performance. This description is the basis for hypothesis 2a which states that the 
independence of the board of directors has a positive effect on ROA. This study found that the greater the 
percentage of the composition of the independent board of directors will increase the company's ROA. The more 
independent directors who are on the board, the more managers will be in achieving better company performance. 
The independence of the board can support managers to optimize the use of assets to generate maximum profits. 
These findings support research from Ofoeda (2017) which found that board independence has a positive effect 
on company performance as measured by ROA. However, these results are not following the results found by Zabri 









1 (Constant) .894 .267  3.344 .001 
Size .224 .095 .525 2.354 .020 
Indepn -2.032 1.355 -.335 -1.500 .136 
Activ -.032 .035 -.074 -.910 .364 
          a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
 
Hypothesis testing of H1b, H2b, and H3b can be answered through the output results in the table 
above. The significance value of the variable board size is significant at the 5% level of significance, while the 
variables of board independence and board activity are not significant at the 5% level. Thus, it can be concluded that 
in equation II, the variable board size has an effect on ROE, while the variable board independence and board 
activity have no effect on ROE. 
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et al., (2016) which states that board independence has no effect on ROA. The results of this study are also not 
following the results found by Arayssi & Jizi (2019) which states that board independence has a negative effect on 
ROA. 
H2b states that board independence has an effect on company performance as measured by ROE. The 
greater the independence of the board, the greater the ability to oversee the manager's performance in maximizing 
profits using the equity held. However, the results of the study show no influence between board independence on 
ROE. The existence of an independent director on the board does not have a significant effect on the achievement 
of ROE. These results are in line with research conducted by Zabri et al., (2016) and Adams & Mehran (2012), 
which found no effect of board independence on company performance. Achievement of company performance 
as measured by the company's ability to optimize equity in generating profits is not necessarily due to the influence 
of the number of independent commissioners on the board. 
   
Results for Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis H3a states that board activity affects ROA. More meetings held by the board of directors will 
contribute to the manager's decision-making to improve company performance. This study found that board 
activity had no effect on ROA. The number or frequency of meetings does not motivate managers to maximize 
ROA.  
The results of this study also reject H3b which states that board activity has an effect on ROE. This means 
that the frequency of board meetings cannot encourage managers to maximize profits by using the equity. The 
results of this study are inconsistent with the results of research conducted by Narwal & Pathneja (2016) and 
Ofoeda (2017) which found a positive influence between the frequency of board meetings on company 
profitability in the banking sector. 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
This study examines the effectiveness of the board of directors as part of a corporate governance mechanism 
in influencing company performance. Board effectiveness is measured by board size, board independence, and 
board activity. Manufacturing companies in the Indonesia Stock Exchange have an average of 6 boards of directors, 
where this number can influence company performance as measured by ROA and ROE. The second mechanism is 
board independence. Board independence, indicated by the presence of independent directors on the board, is 
proven to be able to influence the company's ROA, but it has no effect on ROE. The independence of the board is 
not able to influence managers' decisions in equity management that can generate profits. The third governance 
mechanism is board activity. This study found that the frequency of board meetings has no effect on manager 
performance achievement. 
The limitation of this study is that the data used ends in 2018. The concern experienced is that the end of 
2019 will be the initial year of the COVID 19 pandemic, where the pandemic has an impact on the financial 
conditions of all companies in the world. Of course, many factors can be examined again in influencing company 
performance, one of which is external factors such as an economic recession. Thus the accuracy of the research data 
will be better by considering other factors. Based on these limitations, further research is expected to be able to 
explore other factors that are relevant in influencing company performance during and after the COVID 19 
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